JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. ABSTRACT -I have argued elsewhere that scientific realism is most significantly challenged neither by traditional arguments from underdetermination of theories by the evidence, nor by the traditional pessimistic induction, but by a rather different historical pattern: our repeated failure to conceive of alternatives to extant scientific theories, even when those alternatives were both (1) well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and (2) sufficiently scientifically serious as to be later embraced by actual scientific communities. Here I use August Weismann's defense of his influential germ-plasm theory of inheritance to support my claim that this pattern characterizes the history of theoretical scientific investigation generally. Weismann believed that the germ-plasm must become disintegrated into its constituent elements over the course of development, I argue, only because he failed to conceive of any possible alternative mechanism of ontogenetic differentiation. This and other features of the germ-plasm theory, I suggest, reflect a still more fundamental failure to imagine that the germ-plasm might be a productive rather than expendable resource for the cell. Weismann's case provides impressive support for the problem of unconceived alternatives while rendering its challenge to scientific realism deeper and sharper in a number of important ways.
Introduction
Challenges to scientific realism (the claim that contemporary scientific theories are at least probably and/or approximately true) have traditionally proceeded in one of two ways: either by appeal to the so called 'pessimistic induction' inferring the probable falsehood of present theories from th empirically successful predecessors or by appeal to the underdetermination of theory choice by any possible empirical evidence. The former concern strikes many theorists of science as too simple to be convincing, for contemporary theories are often quite different from those of the past in innumerable particular respects, while devotees of the latter tend to appeal to skeptical fantasies akin to Descartes' famous Evil Demon in a desperate effort to show that there must be choices between theoretical alternatives that no evidence could possibly settle.
In recent and forthcoming work (Stanford 2001 ; in press), I have argued that the most significant challenge to scientific realism does not arise from either of these sources, but instead from our repeated failure to even conceive of the full space of serious scientific alternatives well confirmed by the available evidence before proceeding to embrace just one such alternative by eliminating others. That is, I suggest that the historical record testifies to our repeated failure to conceive of alternatives to the scientific theories proposed at a given time, even when those alternatives were both reasonably well-confirmed by the available evidence and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately embraced by later scientists or scientific communities (i.e. not skeptical fantasies).
Of course, a theory need not accommodate all of the evidence available at a given time to count as well-confirmed, nor need we deny that an older theory can sometimes explain phenomena that a successor cannot or cannot immediately: two theories may simply have different explanatory accomplishments and different evidential anomalies while both remaining reasonably well-confirmed by the totality of the evidence available at a given time. And if we find that scientists of the past have indeed routinely failed to conceive of serious alternatives that were reasonably well-confirmed by the totality of the available evidence, we would have every reason to s appose that similarly serious and well-confirmed alternatives to our own best scientific theories remain presently unconceived. Of several advantages over the pessimistic induction, perhaps the most important is that this problem of unconceived alternatives concerns the theorists rather than the theories of past science: even if contemporary scientific theories sometimes enjoy confirming empirical successes arguably unprecedented in their scope and character, this offers us no reason to suppose that today's theorists are any better at conceiving of the full range of theoretical possibilities confirmed by this evidence than were the greatest scientific minds of the past.
Of course, to decide hoW serious a challenge is posed to scientific realism by this problem of unconceived alternatives we must engage in a detailed examination of scientific inquiry to see if it really does ex claimed. In this paper I hope to contribute considering just one important example August Weismann's development and defe theory of inheritance and generation. My c this development and defense clearly de failure to conceive of serious alternative nonetheless equally well-confirmed by the e and that this in turn supports my suggest unconceived alternatives poses a compell realism itself.
I choose this example in part because we m evidence of the problem we can find in t especially revealing. For one thing, the stau among both scientists and philosophers in naturally suggest that evidence of our histo problem should be particularly difficult to Furthermore, as we shall see, recognition o alternative line of theorizing neglected by W the development of radically new scientific co our fundamental ontology (by contrast wit contemporary physical theories). And finall about inheritance is at least broadly contin theory of the germ-plasm was arguably th development in theorizing about inheritanc (or invention) of Mendel and Mendelian gen directed towards roughly the same collectio articulated under the same broad metaphysi theories of genetics and embryology.
The Emergence of the Theory of the Germ
In the latter decades of the 19th century, that an organism's germ cells are produced by division from its own early embryonic cells and sequestered before the development of its tissues and organs, an arrangement suggested to him by his own earlier work in experimental embryology (see Coleman 1965, 153; Robinson 1979, 153-154; Churchill 1986) . Further evidence and criticism would ultimately force him to abandon this position and argue instead that only a germ -plasm or hereditary substance is reserved from the beginning of ontogeny and passed through a particular series of intervening somatic 6 It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which this initial formulation of Weismann's account was itself conceived in reaction to or even constrained by the ongoing developments in nuclear cytology, however: his central concern at the time was instead with problems of evolution and the transmission of characters from parents to offspring (e.g. the inheritance of acquired traits). Indeed, he would later note that when the Freiburg address was written, '...I was not aware that this germ-plasm existed only in the nucleus of the egg-cell, and I was therefore able to contrast the entire substance of which the egg-cell consists, or the germ-plasm, with the substance which composes the body-cells, hence called somatoplasm ' (1890, 83) . And it was not until the years between 1883 and 1885 that Weismann, Hertwig, and Strasburger would independently focus their attention on the role of the cell nucleus in heredity (see Coleman 1965, 140; Robinson 1979, 141 And despite the fact that they could not be seen under the 11 Weismann also finds it 'probable that the ids correspond to the small granules hitherto called 'microsomata,' which are known to form the individual idants in many animals' (Weismann 1893, 67; see also 1893, 240-241) .
12 Though Weismann allowed that even large groups of identical cells might be represented in the germ-plasm by just a single determinant, any two cells capable of independently heritable variation would have to be represented in the germ-plasm by distinct determinants (Weismann 1893, 53-57 At first blush, Weismann's insistence on germinal specificity is somewhat puzzling: after all, observations of chromosomal behavior in the nucleus had never suggested any differences between the nuclear materials passed to each daughter cell during ordinary cell division, and every somatic cell appeared to wind up with the same amount of chromatin.14 But Weismann concedes these empirical facts while brushing them aside as inconsequential:
14 Indeed, other theorists (e.g. Kôlliker, Strasburger; see Robinson 1979, 151-154 and 159-160) would argue that Weismann's insistence on germinal specificity and an important difference between the germ-plasm contained in various cells (e.g. germ cells and soma) was cytologically implausible. The question now arises as to whether all these fragments of the hereditary substance...are similar to, or different from, one another, and it can easily be shown that the latter must be the case....As the thousands of cells which constitute an organism possess very different properties, the chromatin which controls them cannot be uniform; it must be different in each kind of cell. The chromatin, moreover, cannot become different in the cells of the fully formed organism; the differences in the chromatin controlling the cells must begin with the development of the egg-cell, and must increase as development proceeds; for otherwise the different products of the division of the ovum could not give rise to entirely different hereditary tendencies. This is, however, the case. Even the two first daughter-cells which result from the division of the egg-cell give rise in many animals to totally different parts....The conclusion is inevitable that the chromatin determining these hereditary tendencies is different in the daughter cells. (Weismann 1893, 31-32, original emphasis; see also Weismann 1893, 61) Likewise, Weismann later argues that the very possibility of ontogenetic development and cellular differentiation depends on the capacity for changes in the controlling idioplasm:
The idioplasm...is capable of regular change during growth; and ontogeny, or the development of the individual in multicellular organisms, depends upon thi fact. The two first embryonic cells of an animal arise from the division of th ovum, and continually give rise to differently cons of embryogeny. The diversity of these cells mu changes in the nuclear substance. (Weismann 189 Thus, it is first and foremost the simple an organism's development its various different forms and characteristics that W germinal specificity.15 But this seems sim question back one step. That is, we mus could be so sure that cells must contai hereditary material if their respective development are to diverge.
An important clue to answering this q Weismann's insistence that it must be disintegration of the germ-plasm that diff different germinal materials over the cours In my opinion, it is also an irrefutable fact th regular changes from the ovum onwards: it must, cell to cell, for we know that the individual cell give rise collectively to the functions of the whole contained in the germ-plasm can therefore onl substance undergoes disintegration, and its comp become rearranged. The difference in function seen in the body compels us to suppose that these con various ways. The cells are therefore centres of for substance (idioplasm) which controls them must forces developed by them. (Weismann 1893, 204, Elsewhere Weismann provides a more com process of the disintegration of the germ that each cell is provided with precisely the for its own development; Central to this p divisions separate the idioplasm into constituent elements:
As the greater number of these divisions is conn number of kinds of determinants, the geometr gradually becomes simpler and simpler, until f 15 This argument for germinal specificity appears in Weis Ί therefore believe that we must accept the hypothesis t formation of unequal halves may take place quite as readily that the equality or inequality of subsequently produced daug nuclei ' (1885, 193 biophors. This is an inevitable consequenc determination of the cell. We must suppose th break up into biophors when they have reac assumption allows, at the same time, an explanation circumstance, that the rest of the determinants, w except in the last stages of development, ex (Weismann 1893, 69-70, original emphasis) Here Weismann insists in no uncertain terms that the nuclear idioplasm cannot possibly control the development and differentiation of the cell unless it disintegrates into its constituent material elements.
And he maintains this insistence even as he goes on to emphasize our ignorance of the details of the internal structure of the hereditary material itself:
As each determinant consists of many biophors, it must be considerably larger than a biophor, and is probably therefore unable to pass out through the pores of the nuclear membrane, which we must suppose to be very small and only adapted for the passage of the biophors. Although it is impossible to make any definite statement with regard to the internal structure of the determinants, it must be owing to this structure that each determinant only breaks up into biophors when it reaches the cell to be determined by it. We may suppose that, just as one fruit on a tree ripens more quickly than another, even when the same external influences act on both, so also one sort of determinant may mature sooner than another, although similar nourishment is supplied to both... The assumption of a 'ripening' of the determinants...remains indispensable; or, to express it differently, we must assume that the determinants pass through a the first possibility would require the structures of living cells to come into existence by 'a kind of generatio_equivoca' in which 'they would have arisen by the operation of an external influence on the given substance in the cell, just as would be the case in primordial generation'. And Weismann insists not only that such primordial generation is unknown in 'those forms of life with which we are acquainted', which 'always arise by division from others similar to themselves', but also that '[w]e can only imagine the very simplest biophors as having been produced by primordial generation: all subsequent and more complex kinds of biophors can only have arisen on the principle of adaptation to new conditions of life' (Weismann 1893, 47-48, original emphasis) . Thus 'the structures of a cell-body, which constitute the specific character of the cell, cannot be produced by the emitted influence of the nuclear substance, nor by its enzymatic action, but can only arise owing to the migration of material particles of the nucleus into the cell-body' (Weismann 1893, 48-49, original emphasis The regularity with which all organs are formed in the proper position and mutual relation, may perhaps be taken as a proof of the assumption that they contain latent determinants which are from the first separate, and which differ according to the topographical position of the organ. It is hardly possible that the contrary assumption can be the correct one, for this would render it necessary to suppose that although all the determinants are certainly present in every formative cell, only that one can undergo development which corresponds to the region in which the cell happened to be situated. (Weismann 1893, 150) Having so clearly conceived of the idea that is reproduced at each cell-division and conta each somatic cell of an organism, how c confidently dismiss this possibility out of ha criticisms of de Vries and Driesch make c found it absolutely impossible to conc mechanism of ontogenetic development an could permit the same hereditary material to each somatic cell.17
As we noted above, Weismann endorses a central claims about heredity from Intracellu most importantly the proposal that nuclear con mediated by the passage of material particles surrounding cytoplasm (Weismann 1893 , 46 that it is a profound mistake for de Vries to de as this would undermine the very possib ontogenetic differentiation of cells:
De Vries, on the other hand, considers that the whole of the species are contained in the idioplasm of every, organism. But he does not explain how it is that eac a specific histological character. A new assumption, formulate, would therefore be required to explain why portion of the total amount of idioplasm -which i plant -becomes active in each cell. (Weismann 189 69) Weismann was well aware that it was processes like regeneration and reproduction by budding in plants which led de Vries to suppose that the entire germ-plasm must be present in every cell. But he insisted that ontogenetic differentiation nonetheless requires different constituents of the hereditary material to be present in different cells, with additional partial or complete copies of the idioplasm (in an inactivated state) invoked as a special adaptation and made available only to particular cells of an organism as needed to explain the 17 Elsewhere Weismann dismisses this possibility more offhandedly by suggesting that it violates the principle that 'Nature...always manages with economy' (Weismann 1893 , 63) , but this would seem to be a secondary consideration. Not only is Weismann's explicit argument that ontogenetic differentiation requires different cells to contain different hereditary materials considerably more developed and fundamental, but (as we will see below) Weismann is ultimately forced into a drastic multiplication of unused and inactive partial or complete copies of the germ-plasm to accommodate a wide variety of forms of facultative responsiveness that cells exhibit to their environments, which makes his selective appeal here to the economy of nature look suspiciously opportunistic.
P.
KYLE STANFORD abilities of particula asexually:18
[My] theory explains the differentiation of the body as being due to the disintegration of the determinants accumulated in the germ-plasm, and requires a special assumption, -viz., that of the addition of accessory idioplasm when necessary, -in order to account for the formation of germ-cells, and the processes of gemmation and regeneration. The reconstruction of entire plants or of parts from any point can be easily accounted for by de Vries's hypothesis, just as it can by Darwin's theory of pangenesis, for the pangenes or gemmules are present wherever they are wanted. But de Vries is unable, on the basis of his hypothesis, to offer even an attempt at an explanation of the diversity of the cells in kind and of the differentiation of the body.
These two assumptions appear to me to be of equal value in explaining the fact that in many of the lower plants each cell, under certain circumstances, can apparently reproduce an entire individual... But ... as soon as the soma can become variously differentiated ... any explanation must in the first place account for this differentiation: that is to say, the diversity which always exists amongst these cells and groups of cells arising from the ovum must be referred to some definite principle. De Vries's principle is of no use at all in this case, for it only accounts for the fact that entire plants may, under certain circumstances, arise from individual cells, and does not even touch the main point. In fact, no one could even look upon it as giving a partial solution of the problem, if differentiation is supposed to be due to that part alone of the germ-plasm always becoming active, which is required for the production of the cell or organ under consideration. 19 (Weismann 1893, 223-224) Why is Weismann so confident that no explanation of differentiation will be forthcoming on de Vries's assumption that the entire idioplasm is present in the nucleus of each somatic cell? Why, that is, is he so sure that a 'further assumption' capable of explaining cellular 18 And Weismann repeatedly emphasizes that regeneration or budding can only be initiated from some cells of an organism and not others -a fact which he regards as further evidence for germinal specificity.
19 In the secondary literature, differences between Weismann and de Vries are often ascribed to the fact that Weismann was a zoologist while de Vries was a botanist and each was most impressed and concerned with the hereditary phenomena characteristic of the types of organisms that he had studied most closely (see e.g. Robinson 1979, 175; Bowler 1989, 91) . It is therefore interesting to see Weismann here explicitly describing his own account as equally able to explain characteristic botanical phenomena like budding, as well as better able to explain the phenomena of cellular differentiation, and going on to suggest that de Vries is but he himself is not a victim of the professional provincialism implicit in this contrast: 'But the higher we ascend in the organic world, the more limited does the power of producing the whole from separate cells become, and the more do the numerous and varied differentiations of the soma claim our attention and require an explanation in the first instance... In the lower plants the fact of the differentiation of the soma is liable to be overlooked or underrated, but this cannot possibly be the case as regards the higher animals' (Weismann 1893, 224 (Weismann 1893, 138) .20 And the 'careful must give greater weight than the results are simply the demands that differential parts of the organism seem to make for ger If, however, determinants are contained in the ger part in controlling the formation of the body if, in reach those particular cells which they have to c differentiation of a cell depends primarily on i factor... We can only thereby arrive at the very primary constituents of the germ-plasm are distrib which can actually be observed in the nuclear div situated in those regions which correspond to the v that those primary constituents are present in each parts arising from it. (Weismann 1893, 138) 20 While this may be a surprising methodological injunctio the deterioration of Weismann's eyesight had forced hi research many years earlier (see Coleman 1965, 151 Thus, Weismann's confidence in and insistence on the need for germinal specificity in the face of both the opposing views of his contemporaries and the available experimental evidence rested on a number of distinct failures to conceive of relevant alternative theoretical approaches to particulate heredity. For one, here and throughout Weismann consistently treats the disintegration of the germ-plasm into its diverse constituent elements as the only possible way in which cellular differentiation and ontogenetic development could be directed exclusively from inside the cell. But perhaps even more importantly, Weismann supposes that the only potential alternative to such an internal, disintegrative mechanism of cellular differentiation is the possibility (of which 'we cannot form any conception') that the development of cells coming from every other part of the org was surely influenced by the fact that his which must have appeared to him to have for instance, writes that 'The prospect blastomere is a function, of its position in and translated in Robinson 1979, 182) and develop in connection with each other, th always being dependent upon the develop 105-106; cited in Robinson 1979, 182 any alternative to the disintegration of the germ-plasm into its constituent elements as the mechanism of ontogeny that he is forced to reserve copies of an individual organism's germ-plasm for its own germinal cells from the very beginning of its development. That is, because the organism's own idioplasm must be disintegrated over the course of its development and in the process of cellular control, Weismann finds himself forced to account for such phenomena as reproduction by budding (Weismann 1893, Ch. IV) and the formation of germ cells (Weismann 1893, Ch. VI) by assuming that complete copies of the germ-plasm are produced and reserved from the very beginning of its development for this purpose:
I assume that germ-cells can only be formed in those parts of the body in which germ-plasm is present, and that the latter is derived directly, without undergoing any change, from that which existed in the parental germ-cell. Hence, according to my view, a portion of the germ-plasm contained in the nucleus of the egg-cell must remain unchanged during each ontogeny, and be supplied, as such, to certain series of cells in the developing body. (Weismann 1893, 184) This 'blastogenic idioplasm' consists of one or more complete copies of the organism's germ-plasm, preserved in a special 'inactive' and 'unalterable' state and passed through particular lineages of cells (the 'germ tracks') in the organism's body, ultimately to be located only in its sex cells (after reduction division) and any other cells in a given organism from which offspring may be generated.
Weismann himself appreciates the close connection between this conviction that a special complete copy of the germ-plasm must be various ways in which the developmental response of an organism or a constituent cell to its environment must itself be facultative, for he can allow for such a response only by multiplying the number of physically distinct idioplasms that are potentially available to become activated and guide the development of the organism or cell in question. In discussing regeneration, for example, Weismann finds himself forced to assume not only that a cell or type of tissue capable of initiating the regeneration of any parts of the organism distinct from itself must contain a special 'accessory, idioplasm' ('consisting of the determinants of the parts which can be regenerated by it' (Weismann 1893, 103) ; as a dedicated adaptation for this purpose, but also that an organism's cells must contain multiple distinct accessory idioplasms of this sort if they are to be able to regenerate in multiple directions : he notes that in some segmented worms (such as Nais and Lumbriculus) an amputated part will not only be replaced in the original organism but will also itself regenerate a complete copy of that original organism, and concludes that every cell capable of such bi-directional regeneration must contain two distinct complements of such accessory idioplasm, each of which is supplied with all and only the supplementary determinants needed to produce the rest of the organism in just one direction or the other. As fresh water polyps and sea anemones are able to successfully regenerate complete organisms from each part of a longitudinal as well as a only one set of which becomes developed or activated in any given individual.28 Weismann recognizes that he is thus forced to posit an 'ever increasing complexity of the substance which renders repetition of the organism possible,' but insists that 'it is impossible to explain the observed phenomena by means of much simpler assumptions' (Weismann 1893, 468) . He seems, that is, to recognize no alternative to encapsulating an organism's or cell's developmental response to a particular set of circumstances in a physically distinct accessory germ plasm which simply takes over and becomes the controlling idioplasm of the cell itself under the appropriate conditions. This inability to conceive of an idioplasm capable of a facultative response to its environment not only forces Weismann to multiply the physically distinct idioplasms which might come to control a cell under various kinds of circumstances, but also forces him to insist that a substantial change in the functioning or operation of a cell must be accompanied by a corresponding change in its controlling idioplasm. This feature of Weismann's account becomes especially salient in the course of his discussion of the expulsion of the polar bodies from the egg cell during oogenesis.29 There he first argues that 28 Even when Weismann considers the possibility that polymorphism in bees could be produced by differences in the amount or character of the nutrition with which they are supplied, he conceives of this as a matter of the determinants responsible for particular structures only becoming active when supplied with abundant nourishment. Weismann ultimately rejects this particular potential explanation in any case because each of the two forms he is considering has physiological structures that the other lacks (Weismann 1893, 376-377) .
29 According to our own current theory, during meiosis the chromosomes of a single spermatocyte or oocyte are first doubled, producing twice the chromosome number of an ordinary somatic cell. In spermatogenesis, each spermatocyte then divides into four sperm, each with half the number of chromosomes in an ordinary cell. In oogenesis, however, only a single egg is formed the formation and histological developmen governed by a special kind of dedicated 'oo
If the nature of the cell is determined at all by its id growing and undergoing histological development, by the same idioplasm as that which serves for e consequently assumed the existence of an 'oogeneti the period of its histological differentiation, and also substance gives up control of the cell to the germ-pla The oogenetic idioplasm must exist, and, using th adopted, it may be spoken of as the oogenetic 'det will consequently be the first to become separated fr of the young egg-cell, to disintegrate into its constit through the nuclear membrane into the cell-bod account for no trace of it remaining in the n development not being subsequently impeded by it from each oocyte, so this additional chromosomal mate transformation of an oocyte into the egg cell. These packets during the maturation of the egg are referred to as the 'polar 30 Perhaps most important in producing this recognition was point comparison of spermatogenesis and oogenesis, showin sequence of unusual nuclear divisions that produces four sperm strongly suggesting in turn that each of the three polar bodies (see Churchill 1968, 106-108; 1970, 433 That is, Weismann seems to conceive of th necessarily consisting of a bundle of materia controlling the development and differentiatio never to consider the possibility that the ger represent the cell's (or the organism's) own m or producing such materials.31 Consider, fo inference Weismann draws from establishing that nuclear control of the cell must be me material particles from the nucleus into the su the cell:
If then, each vital unit in all organisms, from the lowest to the highest grade, can only arise by division from another like itself, an answer is given to the question with which we started; and we see that the structures of a cell-body, which constitute the specific character of the .cell, cannot be produced by the emitted influence of the nuclear substance, nor by its enzymatic action, but can only arise owing to the migration of material particles of the nucleus into the cell-body. Hence the nuclear matter must be in a sense a storehouse for the various kinds of biphors which enter into the cell-body and are destined to transform it. Thus the development of the 'undifferentiated' embryonic cell into a nerve-, gland-, or muscle-cell, as the case may be, is determined in each case by the presence of the corresponding biophors in the respective nuclei, and in due time these biophors will pass out of the nuclei into the cell-bodies, and transform them.
31 This sense of 'expendable' is actually closest to the original military usage of the term, which designates supplies or equipment that are expected to be used up, destroyed, or sacrificed in the course of a military engagement (e.g. ammunition) and therefore need not be listed on a certificate of expenditure.
and function of a cell only by multiplying idioplasms that might ultimately come to con activated or developed germ-plasm, since it is n cell, must instead be consumed in the course of function. By contrast, conceiving of the ger resource seems to fairly invite the notion th physical intermediary between specific condi or extranuclear environment and the spec responses provided by the nucleus itself.
Conclusion
Perhaps needless to say, we should not be surprised that Weismann failed to conceive of all possible accounts of particulate inheritance or even of any particular scientifically serious alternative to his own theory. Not all things are conceptually possible or conceivable at all times, and like all scientists, Weismann worked in a particular historical context with a particular set of assumptions, problems, preconceptions, and fundamental concerns which importantly shaped and constrained the range of conceptual possibilities open to him, in ways that historians of science have made familiar to us. But what goes for Weismann goes equally well for us: the very familiarity of these sources of Weismann s inability to conceive of serious and well confirmed alternatives to his own theory give us every reason to suppose that we ourselves occupy a similar epistemic situation and that there are well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best scientific theories that remain presently unconceived.
Thus, the moral is neither that Weismann was unimaginative in failing to conceive of important alternatives to his own view, nor that he was reckless in drawing inferences from what seemed to him in light of the evidence the only forms a successful account of inheritance might take, but rather that even the best scientific minds of the past have repeatedly fallen victim to the problem of unconceived alternatives in ways and for reasons that we have every reason to expect apply in the case of contemporary science as well.
Indeed, Weismann's development and defense of his theory of the germ-plasm would seem not only to offer strong support for the challenge I have posed· to scientific realism, but also to suggest any number of ways in which we might extend and/or deepen the problem of unconceived alternatives itself. We have noted, for unconceived alternatives only represent theoretical science when we are unable to dire central objects of our theorizing. As difficult to characterize the relevant notions of direct observation or detection rigorously, it might nonetheless have seemed reasonable to suppose that more-or-less direct observational contact with the entities about which we are theorizing serves to radically constrain the space of serious and well-confirmed theoretical hypotheses in such a way as to eliminate any real danger posed by the problem of unconceived alternatives. But the case of Weismann makes this strategy of response to the problem look extremely unpromising: after all, Weismann was himself among those who knew that they had managed to observe the hereditary material through the microscope and to track its changing character through such crucial processes as cell-division, fertilization, and the formation of gametes, and he made extensive use of the latest observations in nuclear cytology to argue for and against particular claims about the processes of inheritance and generation. Nonetheless, Weismann remained unable to conceive of important theoretical possibilities concerning any number of aspects of this hereditary material, including its constitution, its operation, and its most fundamental character.
Thus, even the ability to engage in detailed and systematic observation or detection (in the standard scientific senses of those terms) of the objects of our theorizing seems to offer no proof against the relevance or centrality of the problem of unconceived alternatives.
Nor, it would seem, does the ability to make successful novel predictions in a given domain of theorizing indicate that we are beyond the reach of the problem of unconceived alternatives, despite the currency of this notion in much recent philosophy of science. Weismann's prediction of the need for reduction division in the formation of the sex cells still stands as one of the classic cases of confirmed theoretical prediction in the history of biology, and it was recognized as such even by his contemporaries (see Robinson 1979, 182-183) . Nonetheless, Weismann managed to make this surprising novel prediction -about the behavior of a hereditary material that
had not yet even been conclusively identified -while failing to conceive of important theoretical alternatives to his own views of the operation, constitution, and fundamental character of that hereditary material itself, indeed the very alternatives that would ultimately be embraced by later scientific communities.
For these reasons I think we must view Weismann's case not simply as supporting, but also as extending and sharpening the challenge to
